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Abstract
In this paper, we present a general review of hash functions in a cryptographic
sense. We give special emphasis on some particular topics such as cipher
block chaining message authentication code (CBC MAC) and its variants.
This paper also broadens the information given in [1], by including more
details on block-cipher based hash functions and security of different hash
schemes.
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2
1 Introduction
In dictionary, hash is defined as ’to chop into small pieces’ or ’to muddle, mess
up’, [2]. The mathematics, particularly cryptography implicitly combines
these two meanings of hashing to define the term, hash function. The reason
is that, in cryptography a hash function is the name of a process of taking an
input, a message, and messing it up by an algorithm, and finally producing
a smaller output, message digest (hash value), compared to the input. Hash
functions are constructed with the design intent that a hash value should be
like a fingerprint of the message. For a hash value, to be like a fingerprint
means that two randomly chosen messages would have the same hash value
with sufficiently small probability. In other words, hash values should be
compressed representatives of the messages they correspond.
These properties of hash functions provide that they can be used for
data integrity and message authentication. A hash function can be used for
data integrity as follows. Suppose that there is a sender (S ) who will send
a message M to a receiver (R). S first computes the hash value h(M) of
the message in question with a hash function h. Then sends M together
with h(M) to R. When R gets these, he recomputes the hash value of the
possibly modifed message M and compares it with the original hash value
h(M). If these two are equal, then R believes that M is not changed.1 If S
and R also want the authentication of the message sent in this transmission,
S can compute his signature by using an encryption algorithm EK(.) with
key K. Here, S encrypts the hash value h(M) as C = EK(H(M)) and sends
M together with C instead of h(M) to R. When R gets these, by using a
verification algorithm VK(.), he does or does not believe that M was sent by
R depending on the result of verification.
1Here, we assume that h(M) is not affected during transmission.
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2 A Formal Perspective
It is now time to explore hash functions more formally.
2.1 Fundamental Definitions and Results
A very general mathematical definition of a hash function is the following.
Definition 2.1.1 A hash function is a function h : {0, 1}∗ → {0, 1}n for a
fixed positive integer n and with the property that h(x) is easy to compute
for all x ∈ {0, 1}∗ for any person.
Although the above definition refers to the unkeyed hash functions, there
are also keyed hash functions where a hash value is determined by two inputs,
a message and a secret key. In [1], a keyed hash function is defined as follows.
Definition 2.1.2 A keyed hash function is a function h : {0, 1}κ ×
{0, 1}∗ → {0, 1}n for fixed positive integers n and κ if it satisfies the fol-
lowing properties:
1. h is public and h(k, x) is easy to compute for all x ∈ {0, 1}∗ and
k ∈ {0, 1}κ.
2. Without knowing k, it is hard to find x when h(k, x) is given, it is also
hard to find two messages x and x′ with h(k, x) = h(k, x′).
3. Given zero or more (x, h(k, x)) pairs it is hard to find k. This property
is called as key non-recovery.
4. Without knowing k, it is hard to compute h(k, x) for any x even there
is a large set of known (xi, h(k, xi)) pairs, of course for x 6= xi.
There are several approaches of classifying hash functions. For exam-
ple, one grouping method is to divide these functions such as keyed and
unkeyed hash functions as told above. A second approach is to divide them
as block-cipher-based and non-block-cipher-based hash functions. Another
classification is to examine these functions based on the specific requirements
they have. Whatever the classification is, hash functions depending on the
specific application they are used for, should have some significant properties
for security reasons. Some of these properties are as follows.
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1. Preimage Resistance: Given y ∈ {0, 1}n, it is hard to find any
x ∈ {0, 1}∗ ∋ h(x) = y.
2. 2nd-Preimage Resistance: Given x, it is hard to find any x′ 6= x ∋
h(x) = h(x′).
3. Collision Resistance: It is hard to find any x and x′ 6= x ∋ h(x) =
h(x′).
The most important class of unkeyed hash functions are the manipulation
detection codes (MDCs) which are used for data integrity. We can divide
MDCs into two groups one of which is the one way hash functions (OWHFs)
and the other one is the collision resistant hash functions (CRHFs), both are
defined as follows, [3].
Definition 2.1.3 A one way hash function is a hash function with prop-
erties preimage resistance and second preimage resistance.
Definition 2.1.4 A collision resistant hash function is a hash function
with properties 2nd-preimage resistance and collision resistance.
Some sources may define one way hash function without the property
2nd-preimage resistance and may divide the definition of a collision resistant
hash function into two pieces one of which is the weakly collision resistant
hash function (WCFHF) that has only 2nd-preimage resistance and the other
one is the strongly collision resistant hash function (SCFHF) that is defined
only to have collision resistance, [4].
Corollary 2.1.5 A strongly collision free hash function is also a weakly
collision free hash function.
Even collision resistance implies 2nd-preimage resistance as above corol-
lary states, we do not have an implication that collision resistance implies
preimage resistance. The following example illustrates this.
Example 2.1.6 Let f be a CRHF, and define a new function h as
h(x) =
{
x, |x| = mn, m is a nonnegative integer.
f(x), else.
For the above example h is just the identity map for |x| = mn, so has
no collisions for this case. For |x| 6= mn case, h is equal to f(x), so finding
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a collision for h is as hard as finding a collision for f(x). Therefore, h has
collision resistance property. Now take any x ∋ |x| = mn, then preimage of
x is trivially x itself. Hence h has not the property of preimage resistance.
Even though collision resistance does not imply preimage resistance, with
a weak assumption on the relative cardinalities of the domain and range of the
collision resistant hash function, one can prove that collision resistance does
now imply preimage resistance. [4] proves this with the following theorem.
Theorem 2.1.7 Suppose h : X → Z is a hash function where |X| and |Z|
are finite and |X| ≥ 2|Z|. Suppose A is an inversion algorithm for h. Then
there exists a propbabilistic Las Vegas algorithm which finds a collision for
h with probability at least 1/2.
Even though the above theorem is for domains of finite size, the argument
is also valid for the infinite domain {0, 1}∗.
For keyed hash functions, the most important group is the message au-
thentication codes (MACs) which are used for message authentication. The
formal definition of a MAC is as follows, [3].
Definition 2.1.8 A message authentication code algorithm is a family
of functions hk : {0, 1}
∗ → {0, 1}n parameterized by a secret key k ∈ {0, 1}κ,
with the following properties:
1. For any k and x, hk(x) is easy to compute.
2. Given zero or more (xi, hk(xi)) pairs it is hard to compute any (x, hk(x))
pair for x 6= xi. This property is called as computation resistance.
Corollary 2.1.9 A MAC algorithm is preimage resistant, 2nd-preimage re-
sistant, and collision resistant for people not knowing the key.
Corollary 2.1.10 Computation resistance implies key non-recovery.
2.2 Basic Security Considerations
The reason that one needs preimage, 2nd-preimage, or collision resistance
for a hash function is related to ensure the security of the application pro-
cessed. For instance suppose that we have a data integrity and message
authentication scheme as described in the intoruction part of this paper.
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Now suppose that there is an adversary A on the communication link of
S and R. If A computes a signature on a message digest z and finds an
x ∋ z = h(x), then (x, y = EK(z = h(x))) becomes a valid forgery. Thus
a secure hash function should be preimage resistant. Now suppose that
S sends (x, y = EK(h(x))) to R. During this transmission if A finds an
x′ ∋ h(x′) = h(x), then (x′, y = EK(h(x))) is a valid forgery. Hence, a
good hash function should be 2nd-preimage resistant. Finally, suppose that
A finds two distinct x, x′ ∋ h(x) = h(x′) and persuades S to sign h(x), then
(x′, y = EK(h(x))) is again a valid forgery. Therefore, a secure hash function
should also be collision resistant.
For a MAC, a forgery means to break the computation resistance property
in some way. By Corollary 2.1.10, this can be done by recovering the secret
key. However, key recovery is not a necessary condition for a MAC forgery
though it is a sufficient condition. Sometimes, such a forgery can be done by
using only zero or more (x, hk(x)) pairs open to adversary A. Some sources
classify attacks on a MAC algorithm with respect to the A’s ability to control
known (x, hk(x)) pairs, as [3] does as follows.
1. Known-Text Attack: One or more (xi, hk(xi)) pairs are already
available to A.
2. Chosen-Text Attack: One or more (xi, hk(xi)) pairs are available to
A, where xi’s are chosen by A independently.
3. Adaptive Chosen-Text Attack: One or more (xi, hk(xi)) are pairs
available to A, where xi’s can be chosen by A successively, based on the
results of prior queries.
When an A forges a hash function, there are two possibilites related to his
control on the fake message he constructed. If he has partial or full control
over the fake message, he is said to make a selective forgery. On the other
hand, if he is only able to contruct a fake message but has no control on the
fake message, he is said to make an existential forgery.
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3 Block-Cipher Based Hash Functions
As we stated in Section 2, we can divide hash functions as block-cipher and
non-block-cipher based hash functions. In this section, we will explore the
block-cipher based hash functions, by first introducing what a block cipher
is. [5] defines block ciphers mathematically as follows.
3.1 Block-Ciphers
Definition 3.1.1 Let κ and l be two strictly positive integers. A finite
pseudorandom permutation (PRP) or a block-cipher, with key length
κ and block length l is a function F : {0, 1}κ×{0, 1}l → {0, 1}l where F (K, .)
is a permutation for each K ∈ {0, 1}κ.
The following definiton implicitly gives the notion of the security of a
block cipher.
Definition 3.1.2 Let D be a PRP adversary and let F be a PRP with block
length l and key length κ. Define the advantage of D as follows:
AdvPRPD (F ) = Pr[K ← {0, 1}
κ : DFK(.) = 1]− Pr[π ← Perml : D
pi(.) = 1],
where Perml is the set of all permutations from {0, 1}
l to {0, 1}l.
The meaning of the above definition is the following. D makes some
queries for some amount of time and outputs a ′1′ bit indicating that he
believes he is given a PRP. The two probabilities are according to whether
the adversary is given a PRP or a random permutation.
Now, how secure a block cipher is defined as follows.
Definition 3.1.3 Let κ and l be two strictly positive integers. Let F be
a block cipher. We say adversary D can t, q, ǫ− distinguish F from a
random permutation if D runs at most t steps, makes at most q queries
and AdvPRPD (F ) ≥ ǫ.
Example 3.1.4 Here is an example of an insecure block cipher. Let κ = l =
64 and X be a PRP defined as XK(M) = M
⊕
K. Now suppose that we
are able to make two queries. So, we first query as XK(0
64) = 064
⊕
K = K,
hence we got the key if we are given the PRP. Now we make the query
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XK(1
64). If we have 164
⊕
K, we output a ′1′ bit that shows we believe that we
were given the PRP. For a random permutation to have the property π(164) =
π(064)
⊕
1 has the probability 1/(264 − 1). Hence we compute AdvPRPD (X) =
1 − 1/(264 − 1). Hence, we conclude that a secure block cipher should have
small ǫ even we have big q and t in the sense of above definitions.
3.2 Types of Block-Cipher Based Hash Functions
In this section we will examine some examples of block-cipher based hash
algorithms. In general hash algorithms have an iterative nature. Therefore,
it is useful to make the following definition ([3]), to classify hash functions
based on the amount of their block-cipher operations.
Definition 3.2.1 Let h be an iterated hash function constructed from a
block cipher E which performs s block encryptions to process each message
block. Then the rate of h is 1/s.
Now we will give some examples of block-cipher based hash functions and
indicate to which attacks they are open, though we will later in this paper
examine the well-known attack methods.
1. Rabin’s Hash
This hash scheme is due to [6]. First the message is divided into t blocks
whose lengths are equal to the block length of the PRP E. Then the following,
rate-1, algorithm gives us a hash value.
H0 = IV (Initializing Value), Hi = E(Mi, Hi−1), H(M) = Ht, where i ∈ {1, ..., t}.
The above hash method is insecure and open to birthday attack for small
sized hash values as [7] shows. It is also open to meet-in-the-middle attack,
[8].
2. Combined Plaintext-Ciphertext Chaining Hash
This rate-1 hash scheme was offered by [9], which uses one common secret
key for privacy and authentication. The algorithm is as follows.
M = Mt...M1,Mt+1 = IV,Hi = E(K,Mi
⊕
Mi−1
⊕
Hi−1),
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H(M) = Ht+1, where i ∈ {1, ..., t}.
This algorithm is open to birthday attack, [8] .
3. Key Chaining Hash
This rate-1 hash function was constructed by [10] and [11] to strengthen
Rabin’s hash with the following algorithm.
H0 = IV,Hi = E(Mi
⊕
Hi−1, Hi−1), H(M) = Ht, where i ∈ {1, ..., t}.
This algorithm is open to meet-in-the-middle attack. Even though there have
been made many improvements on this scheme, as [12] and [13], it has still
some weaknesses.
4. Matyas-Meyer-Oseas Hash and Davies-Meyer Hash
These hash algorithms successfully resist to meet-in-the-middle attack be-
cause of the one-wayness of the underlying PRP. However, they have still
some weaknesses related to the key used, [14], [15]. The algorithms2 are as
follows for Matyas-Meyer-Oseas and Davies-Meyer respectively, [3], [8].
H0 = IV,Hi = Eg(Hi−1)(Mi)
⊕
Mi, H(M) = Ht, where i ∈ {1, ..., t}.
H0 = IV,Hi = Exi(Hi−1)
⊕
Hi−1, H(M) = Ht, where i ∈ {1, ..., t}.
5. Miyaguchi-Preneel Hash
This rate-1 hash was proposed by [16]. [17] showed that this algorithm is
open to differential cryptanalysis. The algorithm is defined as follows, [3].
H0 = IV,Hi = Eg(Hi−1)(Mi)
⊕
Hi−1
⊕
Mi, H(M) = Ht, where i ∈ {1, ..., t}.
We noted that the above hash schemes have all hash values of length
equal to the block length of the PRP. However there are also hash schemes
which have hash values of length twice of the block length of the PRP. The
motivation for these hash functions are to thwart birthday attacks by ex-
panding the sample space. Now we will give some examples of these types of
block-cipher based hash functions.
2g is a function from {0, 1}l to {0, 1}κ, if κ = l, then g can be chosen as the identity
map.
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6. Yi-Lam Hash
This hash algorithm was proposed by [18]. For this function, we have κ = 2l
and |h(M)| = 2l. We have the following algorithm for this hash function.
H0 = IV1, G0 = IV2,
Ki = Hi−1||Gi−1,
Hi = EKi(Mi)
⊕
Mi, Gi = (EKi(Mi)
⊕
Gi−1)[+]Hi−1,
H(M) = Ht||Gt, where i ∈ {1, ..., t} and [+] is summation modulo 2
l.
Despite the fact that this hash scheme was conjectured to be secure
against all attacks faster than brute force, it was later proved to be inse-
cure [19], [20].
7. MDC2 and MDC4
MDC2 and MDC4 are two modification dedection codes proposed by IBM,
and have rates 1/2 and 1/4 respectively, with the algorithms defined in [3].
Now we will examine the most widely used block-cipher based MAC al-
gorithm, CBC MAC.
3.3 CBC MAC
CBC MAC is the mostly used block-cipher based MAC algorithm today. [21],
[22], and [23] give the algorithm of CBC MAC as follows.
H0 = IV,Hi = E(K,Mi
⊕
Hi−1), H(M) = Ht,where i ∈ {1, ..., t}.
[24] proved that CBC MAC is secure for fixed length messages, say for
messages of length ml for some m. However, default CBC MAC algorithm
is not secure for arbitrary length messages. Let’s give some examples from
[3] and [5] to make this point clear.
Example 3.3.1 Let M = M1...Mt be a message and suppose (M1,MAC1) is
known. Now consider the MAC ofMAC1 which is Ek(MAC1) = Ek(Ek(M1)).
Note that this MAC is also the MAC of M1||0
l. Hence (MAC1,M1||0
l) is a
valid existential forgery.
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Example 3.3.2 Let M = M1...Mt be a message and suppose (M1,MAC1)
and (M2,MAC2) are known. Now consider the MAC of M1||N which is
Ek(MAC1
⊕
N), where N is an arbitrarily chosen message block. Note that
this MAC is also the MAC of M2||MAC1
⊕
N
⊕
MAC2, this again yields to
a valid forgery.
Example 3.3.3 Let M = M1...Mt be a message and suppose (M1,MAC1)
is known. Then the MAC of M1||(M1
⊕
MAC1) is immediately known.
In order to deal with the above deficiency of the CBC MAC, other variants
of this algorithm were developed and proved to be secure. Now, we will give
these in the following part of this section, [5].
1. EMAC
Suppose that we have a CBC MAC hCBC(K1,M). Now we define the EMAC
as hEMAC(K1, K2,M) = E(K2, h
CBC(K1,M)) with an additional key K2 6=
K1, [25]. Since the underlying PRP of the MAC hash only takes inputs of
block length l, the domain of EMAC is ({0, 1}l)+. [26] has showed that the
probability of breaking EMAC, Pr(forge) ≤ 2σ2/2l, where σ is the total
number of blocks of messages whose MACs are known. Clearly, the number
of encryptions is |M |/l + 1.
Even though we have expanded the domain of securely hashed messages
from {0, 1}ml to ({0, 1}l)+, we are still not able to MAC arbitrary length
messages. The first variant of CBC MAC dealing with this problem is the
EMAC∗, which is defined as follows.
2. EMAC∗
Suppose that we have an EMAC, hEMAC. Now we define EMAC∗ as hEMAC
∗
(K1, K2,M) =
hEMAC(K1, K2,M ||10
l−1−|M |modl). The disadvantage of this scheme is that it
creates an unnecessary block when |M | = tl for some integer t. The number
of encryptions is ⌈(|M | + 1)/l⌉ + 1.
3. ECBC
To deal with the extra padding problem of EMAC∗, a new algorithm was
described, called ECBC, which does padding only when necessary. The al-
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gorithm of ECBC, hECBC , is defined as follows.
if M ∈ ({0, 1}l)+ then return hEMAC(K1, K2,M)
else return hEMAC(K1, K3,M ||10
l−1−|M |modl).
In the above algorithm , K3 is a key distinct from K2. Otherwise,
there are trivial collisions. For example, lets take hECBC(K1, K2, K3,M) and
hECBC(K1, K2, K3,M ||10
l−1−|M |modl). They have the same hash value for any
M /∈ ({0, 1}l)+. The number of encryptions in ECBC is ⌈|M |/l⌉ + 1. The-
orem 3.3.5 proves that ECBC is secure, [27], but first consider the following
definiton.
Definition 3.3.4 Let l, m,m′ ≥ 1, then the collision probability of the
CBC MAC, Vl(m,m
′) is defined as follows.
Vl(m,m
′) = max
M∈{0,1}lm, M ′∈{0,1}lm′ , M 6=M ′
{Pr[π ← Perml : h
CBC(π,M) = hCBC(π,M ′)]}.
Theorem 3.3.5 Fix l ≥ 1 and let N = 2l. Let D be an adversary which
asks at most q queries each of which is at most ml-bits. Assume m ≤ N/4.
Then
Pr[π1, π2, π3 ← Perml : D
hECBC(K1,K2,K3,.) = 1]−Pr[R← Rand({0, 1}∗, l) : DR(.) = 1]
≤
q2
2
Vl(m,m) +
q2
2N
≤
(2m2 + 1)q2
N
.
4. FCBC
In order to decrease the number of the encryptions in ECBC PRP from
⌈|M |/l⌉ + 1 to ⌈|M |/l⌉, another algorithm was constructed, called FCBC,
defined as follows.
if M ∈ ({0, 1}l)+ then K ← K2, and P ← M
else K ← K3, and P ←M ||10
l−1−|M |modl
Let P = P1...Pm, where |P1| = |P2| = ... = |Pm| = l
C0 = 0
n
13
for i← 1 to m− 1 do
Ci ← EK1(Pi
⊕
Ci−1)
return EK(Pm
⊕
Cm−1)
Theorem 3.3.6, [27], proves the security of the above algorithm.
Theorem 3.3.6 Fix l ≥ 1 and let N = 2l. Let D be an adversary which
asks at most q queries each of which is at most ml-bits. Assume m ≤ N/4.
Then
Pr[π1, π2, π3 ← Perml : D
hFCBC(K1,K2,K3,.) = 1]−Pr[R← Rand({0, 1}∗, l) : DR(.) = 1]
≤
q2
2
Vl(m,m) +
q2
2N
≤
(2m2 + 1)q2
N
.
5. XCBC
A latest version of the CBC MAC variants is the XCBC algorithm, which
gets rid of using multiple keys as the secret key of the underlying PRP, and
hence uses the same key for all PRP operations. This algorithm is defined
as follows.
if M ∈ ({0, 1}l)+ then K ← K2, and P ← M
else K ← K3, and P ←M ||10
l−1−|M |modl
Let P = P1...Pm, where |P1| = |P2| = ... = |Pm| = l
C0 = 0
n
for i← 1 to m− 1 do
Ci ← EK1(Pi
⊕
Ci−1)
return EK1(Pm
⊕
Cm−1
⊕
K)
Theorem 3.3.7, [27], proves the security of the above algorithm.
Theorem 3.3.7 Fix l ≥ 1 and let N = 2l. Let D be an adversary which
asks at most q queries each of which is at most ml-bits. Assume m ≤ N/4.
Then
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|Pr[π1 ← Perml;K2, K3 ← {0, 1}
l : Dh
FCBC(pi1,K2,K3,.) = 1]
−Pr[R← Rand({0, 1}∗, l) : DR(.) = 1]
≤
q2
2
Vl(m,m) +
(2m2 + 1)q2
N
≤
(4m2 + 1)q2
N
.
4 Non-Block-Cipher Based Hash Functions
In this section, we give a brief review of non-block-cipher based hash func-
tions. The general property of these functions is that they are preimage
resistant and do not use a PRP as a primitive element. Moreover, they may
have mathematically complex structures.
4.1 Some Special Examples
Now, we will give information on some special examples of non-block-cipher
based hash functions.
1. Hash Functions Using Matrices
[28] (Random Matrix Hashing Algorithm) and [29] propose hash functions
based on matrix algebra. In [28], to get the hash value, a secret key is used
which is in the form of a t × l matrix. In [29], the hash value h(M) of a
message M is computed as h(M) = MTRM , where R is a randomly chosen
t× t matrix. [29] has been shown to have some weaknesses.
2. Hash Functions Using Number Theory
These functions are based on the difficulty of solving problems in number the-
ory, and most of them are constructed with a modular arithmetic operation.
Here are some examples.
2.1 RSA-Cipher Block Chaining
The algorithm of this RSA based CBC function is defined as follows, [8].
H0 = IV,Hi = (Hi−1
⊕
Mi)
e mod N,H(M) = Ht, where i ∈ {1, ..., t}.
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The length of N defines the trade off between the security and speed
of this algorithm. In order to acquire a higher speed, this algorithm was
modified by replacing e with 2, or applying this squared modulus only on
either Hi−1 or Mi, [12], [30]. Similar constructions using squaring can be
found in [8], [31], [32], [33], [34].
2.2 Chaum-van Heijst-Pfitzmann Hash Function
This hash function is based on a discrete logarithm problem, which is defined
as follows, [35]. p and q = (p− 1)/2 are two big primes and α and β are two
primitives of Zp. It is difficult to know the value of logαβ and one defines the
Chaum-van Heijst-Pfitzmann Hash Function h : {0, ..., q − 1}2 → Zp − {0}
as h(m1, m2) = α
m1βm2 mod p. The contrapositive of the following theorem
proves the security of the above function.
Theorem 4.1.1 Given one collision for the Chaum-van Heijst-Pfitzmann
Hash Function h, it is easy to compute logαβ.
3. Other Special Hash Functions
There are other hash schemes based on different systems. For example, there
are hash functions based on claw-free permutations ([36]), knapsack problem
([8]), and cellular automata ([37]).
4.2 MD4 Family
MD4 family functions were already overviewed well in the appendix part of
the survey [1]. Alas, we do not give the details of them here again. Some of
these functions are named MD2, MD4, MD5, HAVAL, Snefru-8, RIPEMD
128, SHA-1, RIPEMD 160, MAA, DSA, BCA, FFT-Hash I, FFT-Hash II,
N-Hash. The general property of these functions are they are fast on 32-bit
machines and most of them are considered to be secure. SHA-1 is one of the
most used standards today, [41].
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5 Constructing Hash Functions
It has been shown that we can construct a SCFHF with an infinite domain
from a SCFHF with a finite domain. The following two theorems summarize
this, with details in [4].
Theorem 5.1 Suppose h : (Z2)
m → (Z2)
t is a SCFHF, where m ≥ t + 2.
Then one can construct a function
h∗ :
∞⋃
i=m
(Z2)
i → (Z2)
t,which is a SCFHF.
Theorem 5.2 Suppose h : (Z2)
t+1 → (Z2)
t is a SCFHF. Then one can
construct a function
h∗ :
∞⋃
i=t+1
(Z2)
i → (Z2)
t,which is a SCFHF.
6 Attack Methods
Throughout the paper, we gave some notions of the security of hash functions
in many parts. Therefore, this section is indeed a complementary part to all
of those information. In this section we will talk about the possible methods
of attacks on hash functions.
In general a weak hash function means that its algorithm is open to a kind of
attack, possibly to many. For instance, the simplest possible attack is, for a
message M , to find a correct hash value MD = h(M) with a random guess,
which has the probability 1/2l. Here are the other possible attacks on hash
functions.
1. Birthday Attack
This attack is based on the famous Birthday Paradox3, which is defined as
follows. Let f : {p1, p2, ...} → {d1, ..., d365} be a function from the set of all
people (p′is) to the days of the year (d
′
js). f does simply give the birthday of
the person it was applied. Then finding two people, pi and pk with probability
P such that f(pi) = f(pk), requires almost
√
nln(1/1− P ) applications of
3This is indeed a mathematical fact, not a paradox.
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this function. The same argument can be applied to any hash function to find
collisions. However, if one chooses a set of hash values with sufficiently big
length, this attack does not make any sense from the point of computational
feasibility.
2. Key Search and Pseudo Attacks
Key search attack is used for the keyed hash functions to make a key recov-
ery, hence to break the hash algorithm. This attack is defined as follows.
Suppose there is one or more (Mi, h(K,Mi)) pairs known to A. Then A
selects arbitrary elements, K ′is from the key space {0, 1}
κ and tests whether
h(Ki,Mi) = h(K,Mi) or not. Finally, A tries to determine a suitable secret
key. [38] makes a good analysis of the limits of this kind of key search tech-
nique. In the pseudo attack, again a key is tried to be determined, but this
time it is sufficient for the key to work only with the known (Mi, h(K,Mi))
pairs. This may cause to some weaknesses. These techniques are again sub-
ject to computational feasibility.
3. Meet-in-the-middle Attack
Meet-in-the-middle attack is originated from the birthday attack. This at-
tack is used in the iterated hash schemes to break preimage or 2nd-preimage
resistance. The attack is defined as follows, [8]. First a selected message is
divided into two parts. One starts from the initial value and goes forward, at
the same time he starts from the hash result and comes backward. The prob-
ability of getting a collision in the intermediate stage is the same probability
in the birthday attack. For details, one can look at [38], [39].
4. Correcting Block Attack
This attack is defined as follows. For a given hash value MD, one selects a
message M and starts to concatenating a redundancy to this message until
the hash value h(M) will be equal to MD.
5. Differential Cryptanalysis
This attack is due to [40], which is done by examining the correlation between
the inputs and outputs of a hash function.
6. Fixed Point Attack
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This attack is again for the iterated hash schemes, which aims to find a
fixed point in an intermediate stage. For instance suppose, we have a round
function f , which satisfies at an intermediate stage i the equation f(xi, mi) =
xi. Then we may replace mi with an other block m
′
i and can get the same
hash value as a result.
7 Conclusion
We intended to give an overview of almost all types of hash functions con-
structed during the short history of hash algorithms. We included mathe-
matical definitions, theorems and facts to make the issue more precise. We
gave information on sufficient security levels for hash functions by introduc-
ing possible attack methods on these functions. Hence, a general reader may
now use this technical report as a survey of hash functions.
8 Notes
This paper has not been published yet, the reference to this paper can be
currently done as ′T. Ozsari. A Hash of Hash Functions. Technical Report.
Departments of Mathematics and Computer Engineering, Koc¸ university,
October 2003.′
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